455, 125 A. *1098 The validity of the Doctrine has been called into question. Martin Chevrolet was on notice of the factual basis (the Demonstrator Agreement) and the legal basis (strict liability) for the third-party claim from the initial pleading. C. § 2-106(1), which provides: “A ‘sale’ consists in [sic] the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.” The Demonstrator Agreement clearly reflects that title to the demonstrator vehicle did not pass from Martin Chevrolet to Beattie. The demonstrator vehicle was not to be used for personal errands, vacations, etc. D.R.E.  For example, the amicus curiae brief of the Delaware Trial Lawyers Association ("DTLA") provides data which suggest that abrogation of the doctrine has had no negative effects on insurance premiums, thus indicating that the number of fraudulent or collusive suits has not risen dramatically.  The amicus curiae brief of the Section on Women and the Law of the Delaware State Bar Association ("DSBA") argues that abrogation of the Doctrine with respect to intentional torts is necessary because neither Delaware divorce law nor Delaware criminal law provide adequate remedies for intentional torts committed against spouses. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 122 (5th ed. 9. Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. Robert L. Boyles and Asplundh Tree Expert Co., a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Martin Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and General Motors Corporation, Third-Party Defendants. There is logic to the argument that, in cases where the parties have since divorced, there is little, if any, justification for barring an injured spouse from suing for intentional torts as well. The record reflects that Martin Chevrolet would deduct twenty dollars ($20) per week from an employee's salary to pay for insurance premiums, and two dollars ($2) per week for a “general repair” fund.  While the Superior Court requested that an amended motion for summary judgment be filed encompassing a cross-claim asserted by codefendants Boyles and Asplundh, the Superior Court ultimately declined to grant summary judgment as to that cross-claim. General Motors has agreed to indemnify Martin Chevrolet with respect to the strict liability claim. Accordingly, it is conceivable that spouses may decide to divorce solely to bypass the restrictions of a Doctrine which putatively is designed to *1099 preserve marital harmony. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes: (i) the transaction reflected in the Demonstrator Agreement is neither a lease nor a bailment; and (ii) Martin Chevrolet, nevertheless, may be held strictly liable for defects in demonstrator vehicles it supplies to its sales staff as a means of promoting either the use or consumption of its vehicles for sale or lease. In both instances, the demonstrator vehicle was “placed in circulation” by Martin Chevrolet in such a manner that, if defective, it could injure both passengers and bystanders.28 Under these circumstances, the extension of strict liability to Martin Chevrolet for defective demonstrator vehicles it places in circulation is appropriate.29, Martin Chevrolet has urged the Court to reject § 20(b) of the Restatement Third because its application in this case would countenance a result where an automobile dealership could be strictly liable for defects in a demonstrator vehicle, but could not be strictly liable for defects in the same vehicle after it is sold. The trial court granted the motion, but requested that an amended motion for summary judgment be filed. Margaret Beattie initiated this action against her husband (Beattie), Asplundh, and Boyles. On June 23, 1992, the Superior Court issued an order granting the amended motion for summary judgment. The Court is compelled to recognize an issue which has been identified but not decided by this Court, namely, whether strict liability has been preempted in the lease context by the adoption in 1992 of Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code governing leases of goods. of Delaware Supreme Court opinions. Martin Chevrolet delivered the demonstrator vehicle to Beattie for the purpose of allowing Beattie to drive it, and to demonstrate it to potential customers, with the expectation that Beattie ultimately would return the demonstrator vehicle to Martin Chevrolet if he didn't sell it first. The genesis of this dispute is an automobile accident that occurred on July 15, 1991, when a vehicle operated by Michael Beattie (“Beattie”) collided with the rear of a truck owned by the Asplundh Tree Expert Company (“Asplundh”) and operated by Robert L. Boyles (“Boyles”). ; Golt, 644 A.2d at 991 n. 1 (recognizing but not deciding the question because the transaction at issue predated the adoption of Article 2A and, moreover, neither party claimed that the transaction was a lease). In Plotkin, the Superior Court adopted the Doctrine primarily on the belief that upon marriage, the identity of the wife merged with that of the husband. In keeping with the “constant extension and refinement” 26 of the doctrine of strict liability in the common law, the Court must determine whether the transaction embodied in the Demonstrator Agreement, however it may be characterized, should give rise to strict liability when a defective demonstrator vehicle causes injury. The claims against General Motors are grounded in negligence and breach of warranty. Flagg v. Loy, Kan. The first amended third-party complaint clearly describes the nature of the transaction facilitated by the Demonstrator Agreement and alleges, based on that transaction, that Martin Chevrolet is strictly liable for defects in the design of the demonstrator vehicle operated by Beattie at the time of the accident.